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Abstract
Economic progress and political stability in the last four decades has 
turned Malaysia into a favoured destination for prospective migrants pur-
suing education at Malaysian institutions of higher learning, in search of 
better lives as well as better economic opportunities. Besides voluntary 
migrants there are also a small number of asylum seekers and refugees 
who are forced to leave their homeland because of persecution by the 
state, or political instability. In 2012, Malaysia had around 221,836 people 
of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UN-
HCR). Of these, 101,835 were asylum seekers and refugees mainly from 
ASEAN member countries. Over 92 percent are from Myanmar. They 
comprise several ethnic groups but the most problematic are the Muslim 
Rohingyas, numbering over 22,700 in 2012 who have endured decades of 
persecution and discrimination by the government and were stripped of 
their Myanmar nationality in 1982. Malaysia is not a signatory to the Con-
vention on the Status of Refugees 1951 and it has no legal mechanisms 
to administer the refugees. Technically, they are “illegal immigrants” as 
they arrived illegally and without travel documents. Consequently, life for 
asylum seekers and refugees is a relentless struggle economically, socially, 
and security-wise. One of the major challenges for them is in the area of 
marriage and the family. As many of the Rohingya refugees are men, there 
is an acute shortage of prospective brides from their community. Rohingya 
men are induced to marry out, mainly with other foreign women who are 
working in Malaysia.
This chapter provides a brief account of the socio-economic and legal 
status of the Rohingya, examines their marriage patterns, and explains 
why many - especially men - are marrying out of their ethnic group. It will 
discuss the consequences of exogamic marriage, especially with foreign 
women in Malaysia, for the status, identity and rights of wives and offspring 
Transnational Marriages among Muslim Refugees 
and Their Implications on Their Status and Identity 
— The Case of the Rohingyas in Malaysia1
Azizah Kassim
176
Azizah Kassim
involved. Data for the chapter was gleaned from a nationwide survey on 
the socio-economic status of the Rohingya carried out between 2009 and 
2010, and on-going fieldwork on the same community.
Key words:  Asylum seekers, refugees, Rohingya, and transnational marriages.
1. Introduction
Since the 1970s, Malaysia’s political stability and relatively better economic de-
velopment than some of its neighbours attracted large scale inflows of foreign 
nationals. In the Population Census 2010, the number of non-citizens residing 
in Malaysia rose to 2.3 million - or 8.2 percent of the total population - from over 
1.2 million (5.5%) in 2000. Among the foreigners are voluntary migrants in pur-
suit of higher education, better lives, and economic opportunities of which low-
skilled foreign workers form the largest group. There are also a small number of 
involuntary migrants comprising asylum seekers and refugees who are forced to 
leave their country because of state persecution, political instability, and natural 
disaster. Of these the highest number are from member countries of the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
In 2012 Malaysia had around 221,836 people of concern to the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) of which 90,185 were refu-
gees, and 11,650 asylum seekers registered with the UNHCR in Kuala Lumpur2 
(UNHCR Global Trends 2012: 39–41). Over 92% were from Myanmar. They 
comprise several ethnic groups – Chins, Karen, Mons, Rohingyas, Burman Mus-
lims, and others of which the most problematic are the Muslim Rohingyas, who 
have long suffered persecution under the ruling junta and were stripped of 
Myanmar citizenship in 1982 (Zaw, M.H, 2003). They began to arrive in Malay-
sia in small numbers in the late 1970s, and their inflow escalated by the 1980s. 
In the second half of 2012, thousands of Rohingya arrived in Malaysia to escape 
inter-ethnic conflict with Buddhists which saw hundreds of Rohingya dead 
and thousands displaced and dispossessed. Most of the new arrivals were not 
registered with UNHCR Kuala Lumpur. Nonetheless, the number of Rohingya 
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registered in 2012 rose to 22,772, making them the second largest ethnic group 
among the Burmese refugees, next to the dominant group, the Chins.
As Malaysia is neither a party to the Geneva Convention Related to the 
Status of Refugees 1951, nor the New York Protocol 1967, refugees in the coun-
try are in a legal limbo. There are no legal mechanisms to administer them, 
and their basic rights as enshrined the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) is not guaranteed by the state, making their lives a relentless struggle. 
Being outside the law is problematic and one area where the problem is most 
acute is the institution of marriage and the family. The majority of the Rohingya 
refugees are males and with the acute shortage of women, many are induced to 
marry out of their ethnic group. Based on our research carried out since 2009, 
about 25% of all married male Rohingyas have non-Rohingya wives whom they 
met and married in Malaysia. Such marriages are viewed with concern by some 
sections of the community as they are perceived as diluting ethnic identity and 
negatively affecting the status of wives and offspring, especially their rights to 
protection and assistance from the UNHCR.
This chapter provides a brief account of the socio-economic and legal sta-
tus of the Rohingya, examines their marriage patterns, and explains why many, 
especially men, are marrying out of their ethnic group. It will explain the conse-
quences of marrying out, especially with foreign women in Malaysia, for the sta-
tus, identity, and rights of wives and offspring involved. Data for the chapter was 
gleaned from a nationwide survey on the socio-economic status of the Rohingya 
carried out between 2009 and 2010, and ongoing fieldwork on the same commu-
nity.
2. Significance of the Study
The chapter is undertaken in the light of serious inter-ethnic and inter-religious 
conflicts in the Rakhine region in Myanmar beginning June 2012, involving the 
Buddhist population and Muslim Rohingyas, that left hundreds of Rohingya 
injured and dead and over 140,000 homeless. While there are overwhelming 
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expressions of sympathy from the world community for the ethnic Rohingyas in 
the conflict area, many people are unaware of the plight of Rohingyas who left 
Myanmar in the last three decades or so as a result of their continuous persecu-
tion by the state. The UNHCR estimates that about 1.5 million Rohingyas (or 
about half of their population) have left Myanmar in search of political asylum 
abroad. This chapter tries to project the plight of the Rohingya refugees in Ma-
laysia, in the hope that they too will receive some attention and assistance.
There is a dearth of serious work on refugees in Malaysia. This may be due 
to their relatively small number compared to over 3.1 million economic migrants 
(both legal and irregular)3 who are more visible and problematic, thus capturing 
the attention of many researchers. Refugees are officially categorized as irregu-
lar migrants, or “illegal immigrants” as they are referred to locally. This blurred 
distinction between the two types of irregular migrants appears to have been 
accepted uncritically by some. In many academic writings, especially on refugees 
in Sabah, refugees are subsumed in the literature on irregular migrants. How-
ever, in recent years there have been attempts made by a few in the academic 
community in Malaysia to differentiate between the two categories of migrants; a 
few have ventured into refugee studies. One of the earlier studies on refugees is 
a Master’s thesis by Tan (2008) on the Rohingyas in the Klang Valley (Selangor 
and Kuala Lumpur). Adopting an anthropological approach she examined the 
lives of the Rohingyas, the difficulties they faced in adjusting to the new social 
landscape, the changes they had to make in their social structure and organisa-
tion. Another anthropological study is by Azizah (2009) which deals with Filipino 
refugees in Sabah. Azizah highlights the many negative stereotypes held by the 
local population of the refugees, which she refutes based on empirical data. In 
view of their long stay in Sabah and their contributions to the state’s economic 
development, she calls for a durable and humane solution to the protracted Fil-
ipino refugee problem by according them permanent resident status. There are 
also four other Masters’ theses on the refugees by Shazlin Yanti (2009), Andika 
Ab. Wahab (2011), Aizat Khairi (2012) and Hunnekes (2012). The work of Sha-
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zlin Yanti, Andika and Aizat are anchored in international relations, focussing 
on the human security of the refugees. Shazlin Yanti concerns herself with all 
Myanmar refugees in Malaysia, while Andika studied the Chins. Aizat compares 
state policy on the Rohingyas in the Peninsula and the Moro (Filipino) refugees 
in Sabah, and the impact such policy and its implementation has on the human 
security of both groups. Hennekes, on the other hand, examines public percep-
tions of Muslim Refugees (Rohingyas and Acehnese) in Malaysia as reported in 
the Malay national daily Utusan Melayu. In 2012, Aryanthi Azis an independent 
researcher also studied the Rohingya community under an Asian Public Intellec-
tual (API) fellowship project focusing on the problems faced by the Rohingyas 
as undocumented people in Malaysia.
A major theme cutting across these recent works is the concern for the 
plight of the refugees and the need to accord them some basic rights; a shift 
from the concern of earlier studies which saw the refugees - part of the irregu-
lar migrants category - as a threat to national security (see among others, Ramli 
Dollah, Wan Shawaluddin, Diana Peters, and Marja Azlima Omar, 2003). This 
chapter, which is an extension of my earlier paper on the Rohingyas (Azizah 
2010) will hopefully help reduce the gaps in the current literature on refugees 
in Malaysia.
3. State Responses to the Refugees
Refugees, like many irregular economic migrants, do not have proper travel 
documents and enter Malaysia illegally. Technically, refugees are “illegal immi-
grants” who can be charged under the Immigration Act 1959/63 for illegal en-
try. Nonetheless, in accordance with Section 14 of the UDHR, Malaysia adopts a 
humanitarian approach towards asylum seekers reaching its shores by allowing 
them to stay in the country until a durable solution is found for them. However, 
there is no legal mechanism in place to administer them. This leaves the asylum 
seekers and refugees in a legal quagmire, for while they are allowed to stay, their 
rights as residents in the country are not defined. It also leaves enforcement of-
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ficers in a bind as they are unclear how to deal with the refugees. The refugees’ 
ambiguous legal position leave enforcement officers no choice but to resort to 
the Immigration Act 1959/63 for guidance in their encounters with them. Un-
der this Act, irregular migrants are liable for arrest and be charged in court and 
if found guilty, they can be fined, caned, imprisoned, and then deported. It also 
makes the refugees vulnerable to all kinds of exploitation, discrimination, and 
persecution by unscrupulous parties. For example, they are often short-changed 
by employers and subject to extortion by criminal gangs offering protection as 
well as by rogue law enforcement officers (see among others, SUARAM Annual 
Report (various years), Amnesty International, 2010 (55–62) and The Equal 
Rights Trust, 2010). As residents in Malaysia, the refugees’ fundamental human 
rights - particularly freedom from fear and want - are not protected. Their basic 
rights to choose their job, to own property, to marry and found a family, to gain 
access to basic housing, state health and educational facilities as well as legal re-
course to justice are not guaranteed by law.
Over the years, however, there have been a few concessions made by the 
state to assist some sections of the refugee population, especially those with so-
cial and cultural links with the dominant local population. For example, Muslim 
Cambodian refugees in the Peninsula who arrived in the mid 1970s have been 
granted permanent resident status (Mohamad Zain 2003), while Filipino refu-
gees with close kinship links with some Sabah Bumiputera/indigenous groups are 
allowed temporary stays under the IMM13 pass4, renewable every year. In 2002 
and 2006 the Federal government announced a plan to give them permanent 
resident status but the plan was not executed due to strong opposition from 
some Sabah politicians5 (see Azizah Kassim, 2009). There was also an attempt in 
2004 to grant temporary stays under the IMM13 pass to the Rohingyas in view of 
their stateless status, but the plan was aborted within two weeks of its implemen-
tation due allegedly to malpractices in the registration process which saw some 
economic migrants from Bangladesh and India being registered as Rohingyas, 
thus making them eligible for the IMM13 card. The government too has granted 
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the refugees 50% discounts on medical charges at state hospitals. Most impor-
tantly, since 2002 there has apparently been a “covert” understanding among 
enforcement officers not to arrest refugees and if they are mistakenly arrested, 
intervention by officials from UNHCR Kuala Lumpur is sufficient to have them 
released. Such a directive which was allegedly reiterated in 2011 did not trickle 
down to enforcement officers in the field, and Rohingyas and other refugees 
continue to be arrested even now.
To benefit from the concessions made by the Malaysian government as well 
as social and financial assistance from the UNHCR, refugees must have a UN-
HCR refugee registration card or written proof that they have registered them-
selves as asylum seekers with the agency and are waiting for confirmation of their 
status as refugees. In practice however, many refugees especially the Rohingyas 
do not have a refugee registration card either because they have not registered 
as asylum seekers with UNHCR, or because they are waiting for their card to be 
processed. Getting to the only UNHCR office in Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur is 
a problem for many asylum seekers especially those from outlying states in the 
north, east, and southern parts of the Peninsula. For those living in Johor, Pen-
ang, Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, and Pahang for example, the cost of getting 
access to the UNHCR office in Kuala Lumpur is prohibitive, especially if there 
are many in their family. The costs include transport, accommodation, subsis-
tence in Kuala Lumpur, and loss of earnings. The administrative procedures are 
lengthy; some may take years and require several trips to the UNHCR office. As a 
result, many refugees go without any UNHCR documents. Some of the undocu-
mented whom I met during fieldwork have been in Malaysia for more than a de-
cade. In one family in Penang, the household head and his family members have 
gone without documents for 19 years because he cannot afford to go to Kuala 
Lumpur to register them.
Those without such documents cannot access the few benefits/concessions 
conferred on the refugees by the state and the UNHCR. They are also excluded 
from assistance and protection by the UNHCR which includes the three durable 
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solutions to their problems i.e. resettlement, voluntary repatriation, and local 
integration. Without the card they are more likely to be treated by enforcement 
officers in the same manner as irregular economic migrants. The stress on of-
ficial documentation and the difficulty in getting such from the UNHCR drive 
many refugees to buy fake UNHCR cards from the many syndicates specialising 
in forgery.
4. A Profile of the Rohingya Refugees in Malaysia
The Rohingya began arriving in Malaysia at the end of 1970s. In the early 1980s 
when Myanmar revoked their citizenship, the inflow into the country increased, 
a pattern that continues to present day. They are smuggled into the country 
by sea or by land via Thailand, entering Malaysia largely through the northern 
states of Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis, and Penang. They choose to come to Malaysia 
instead of staying in Thailand as it is a Muslim country and, for later arrivals, 
because they may already have relatives in Malaysia. Some arrive in Malaysia us-
ing fake passports, making their way via Bangladesh. As many arrive in Malaysia 
surreptitiously and undocumented, their actual number cannot be ascertained. 
Statistics from UNHCR Kuala Lumpur reveal that in 2012 there were 22,772 
Rohingya refugees and asylum seekers in the country. However, because many 
asylum seekers are not registered with the UNHCR, their actual number is much 
higher. Our nationwide survey on 940 households covering over 5,300 people 
in 2009–2010 found that about 25% of Rohingya household members are not 
registered with the UNHCR. Based on these findings it can be assumed that the 
actual number of Rohingyas is 25% greater than those registered with the UN-
HCR; probably around 25,500. With the new arrivals from Myanmar after the in-
ter-ethnic conflicts in June 2012, their number is said to have risen considerably 
to an estimate of 35,000 in 2013.
4.1. Geographical Location
Rohingya refugees are found only in the Peninsula and, as some have been in 
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the country for over three decades, there are now identifiable Rohingya com-
munities in many states. The largest concentration is in the Klang Valley where 
30.7% of the Rohingya population is found. This is followed by Penang (14%), 
Kedah (5.7%), Johor (5.2%), and Terengganu (2.5%). Smaller numbers are 
found in Pahang, Kelantan, Melaka, Negeri Sembilan, and Perak (see Map 1 and 
Chart 1). There is no record of Rohingya settlements in Perlis although the state 
which shares a common border with Thailand is often used by undocumented 
Rohingyas to enter Malaysia illegally. Rohingyas prefer to live in Kedah which is 
next door to Perlis as there are already a number of Rohingya communities in 
the state, i.e. in Alor Star and Sungai Petani. Furthermore the prospect of get-
ting a job in Kedah is much better than in Perlis which is a relatively poor state 
in the Peninsula.
Although there are many identifiable Rohingya communities in these states, 
attesting to their long stay and “settled” status, a large number of Rohingyas - 
especially the newly arrived adult male population - lead an ambulatory lifestyle, 
moving from place to place in search of jobs. Once they are financially stable, 
they will usually find a permanent place to stay close to their own ethnic group.
Johor
5.2%Kedah5.7%
Kelantan
1.4%
Melaka
0.7%
Negeri Sembilan
1.3%
Pahang
1.9%
Perak
0.7%
Pulau Pinang
14.0%
Putrajaya
0.1% Selangor
22.8% Terengganu
2.5%
Kuala Lumpur
7.9%
others
35.7%
Chart 1:  Distribution of Rohingya Refuges by Administrative States in the Peninsula 
(June 2012) Total: 22,772
Source: Unpublished data from UNHCR Kuala Lumpur.
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Map 1  Location of Rohingya Communities in Peninsular Malaysia, 2012
Source: Adapted from a map provided by the UNHCR, Kuala Lumpur.
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4.2. Demographic Profiles
Most of the Rohingya refugees are males who arrive without female family mem-
bers. The latter - especially wives and young children - are sent for at a later date 
when the men are financially stable. It may take a decade before wives and chil-
dren arrive, if at all. A large number of the male population are in the economi-
cally active age group, between the ages of 18 and 59 (see Chart 2 & 3).
Chart 2  Rohingya Refugees By Sex ( June 2012) Total: 22,772
Source: Unpublished data from UNHCR Kuala Lumpur. 
Chart 3: Rohingya Refugees By Age ( June 2012) Total: 22,772
Source: Unpublished data from UNHCR Kuala Lumpur. 
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4.3. Economic Status
In an earlier paper (Azizah 2010) the writer provided an account of the so-
cio-economic status of the Rohingya community in Malaysia. The situation is 
somewhat the same today. In terms of living areas, they are mainly urban-based 
where jobs are easier to find. In view of their blurred legal status and lack of 
formal documents they have no access to formal employment, hence their con-
centration in the informal sector where they are engaged in paid employment 
or are self-employed. In the former, they work as labourers in the construction 
sector and in wholesale markets; as cleaners, cooks and dishwashers in restau-
rants, or are employed as garbage collectors by contractors engaged by urban 
authorities to clean towns and cities. A few with some form of formal education 
at secondary or post-secondary levels - in particular those specialising in Islamic 
education - are engaged as teachers in community-based learning centres6 where 
English, Malay, science, mathematics, and Islamic subjects are taught to primary 
school children. The self-employed work as gardeners, collect discarded goods 
(cardboard boxes, newspapers, plastic bottles, iron rods, etc.) for sale, engage 
in petty trading selling semi-precious stones, fish, vegetables, and cooked food 
at roadside stalls, or take up contracts to supply shops with cooked food. A few 
become building sub-contractors. In the countryside, they are mainly employed 
in the agricultural sector. In Kedah, for example, many are contract workers in 
padi planting while others work with smallholders dealing in rubber, oil palms, 
fruit, or vegetables. For the majority, jobs are temporary. They work for short 
spells of a week or more, are dismissed, then re-hired as and when their services 
are needed. Unemployment and under-employment are major features of their 
economic activities.
The majority are very poor, living hand-to-mouth on average daily earnings 
of RM30–RM40 due mainly to exploitation by greedy employers, or customers in 
the case of the self-employed. To augment their meagre income, many - especial-
ly women and children - resort to begging, especially on Fridays and on religious 
and festive periods such as the Muslim month of Ramadan, Eidil Fitri (the cele-
187
Transnational Marriages among Muslim Refugees and Their Implications on Their Status and Identity
bration at the end of Ramadan), Eidil Adha (the end of the annual Haj pilgrim-
age), Chinese and Indian New Year festivals, and Christmas. For a few, especially 
the old, the sick, as well as single mothers with many young children, begging is 
their main occupation. We found twenty elderly beggars in one Penang village 
alone. However, there are a few “successful” Rohingyas, especially those who 
have been in the country for over three decades and who are in the retail busi-
ness or working as sub-contractors in the construction sector.
5. Family and Households
The Rohingyas are divided into several ethnic sub-groups from different areas 
in the Rakhine region in Myanmar. Members of each ethnic sub-category, espe-
cially those with close family and kinship links, usually live close to each other to 
enable co-operation, especially in crises such as major illnesses, accidents, when 
a household head gets arrested, or a death in the family.
In urban areas, they live in rented accommodation in low cost public hous-
ing, squatter areas, and undeveloped slum-like “urban villages”. Young unmar-
ried males usually live together, forming all male households at their workplace, 
the most popular of which are “kongsi”: make-shift temporary structures provided 
by building contractors for workers at construction sites. Many also form groups 
of five or six and live together in rooms rented from Rohingya households or 
in newly built shop lots where one unit is often shared by a group of fifteen to 
twenty people7. Over 36% of Rohingya households are all-male. The number 
of nuclear family households is relatively small (25.2%) while extended family 
households form the majority at 38.6%. In the latter, nuclear families share their 
living space with close family members; siblings, parents, or other relatives of the 
household head or his wife. There are also a few polygamous households where 
co-wives and their children live together.
In rural areas, they often live in Malay villages among the local Malay pop-
ulation with whom they share a common religion – Islam. They usually occupy 
abandoned houses rented from absentee owners who have since migrated to 
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towns. A few lucky ones pay no rent on condition that they take care of the 
house and the orchards for the owners. Sharing living space as in urban areas is 
also common to defray living costs and to facilitate mutual help. The majority of 
all rural households are the extended type with a few all-male households. The 
need to live close together is felt most in rural areas as their numbers are usually 
small and they live among strangers.
In both rural and urban areas, average household size is six persons to a liv-
ing unit (a room or house) with a few having over fifteen people. Overcrowding 
is common in urban areas where housing cost is relatively high in comparison 
with income. In Kuala Lumpur and Selangor for example, monthly rental for a 
squatter hut is RM400, and RM700 for a two room low-cost public housing unit. 
The majority of Rohingya homes have limited basic amenities. They are also 
sparsely furnished, mainly with goods picked from dumping grounds, repaired, 
and put on sale by some enterprising members of the community. These include 
settees, television sets, radios, fridges, wall pictures, cooking pots and pans, and 
other utensils.
6. Marriage Patterns
As Muslims, the Rohingyas view marriage as a necessary union for both adult 
men and women, mainly to prevent them from getting involved in immoral ac-
tivities and sexual misadventure. Marriage is for procreation and to cater for the 
basic daily needs of men and women. Their goal in marriage is practical: to com-
plement male and female roles. As explained by many Rohingya respondents, 
a man needs a woman to do household chores and to care for him as would his 
sister and mother, because the former would marry out of the family, and the lat-
ter he would outlive. Correspondingly, a woman needs a man to support, protect 
and care for her through life. Marriage is usually arranged by family members 
or, in the case of older men separated from wives in Myanmar and looking for 
a second wife, by friends. As in many traditional marriages, the majority of Ro-
hingyas do not believe in love before marriage: love is expected to develop after 
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marriage. Non-marital unions are highly frowned upon.
Preferred marriage partners are those from their own ethnic group espe-
cially between members of a kinship group who originated from the same village 
or districts back home in the Rakhine region in Myanmar. Similarities in family 
background, religion and culture are seen as a necessary ingredient for a suc-
cessful marriage. However, such ideals are rarely attainable in Malaysia due de-
mographic and financial reasons.
Based on data from UNHCR Kuala Lumpur, there is an acute lack of fe-
males among the Rohingya population in Malaysia, especially those in the mar-
riageable age group. As shown earlier, the majority (73.6%) of the Rohingya 
population comprises males, and the number of males in the marriageable age 
group far outweighs that of females. As shown in Table 1, the number of men in 
the marriageable age group (18–60+years) is 14,056 compared to 3,322 women 
Table 1  Marital Status By Age & Sex (June 2012)
Male Female
Ages
(Years)
0–4 5–12 13–17 18–59 60＋
Sub-Total
(No. & %)
0–4 5–12 13–17 18–59 60＋
Sub-total 
(no. & %)
Divorced 122 14
136
(0.8)
1 89 3
93
(1.5)
Engaged 13
13
(0.1)
0
Married 7 6,918 238
7,163 
(42.7)
24 2,180 31
2,235
(37.2)
Single 1,382 1,332 721 5,864 2
9,301 
(55.5)
1,310 1,241 517 373 2
3443
(57.4)
Separated 25 2
27
(0.2)
25
25
(0.4)
Widow 99 31
130
(0.7)
113 93
206
(3.5)
Total
(%)
1,382
(8.2)
1,332
(8.0)
728
(4.3)
13,041
(77.8)
287
(1.7)
16,770
(100)
1,310
(21.8)
1,241
(20.7)
542
(9.0)
2,780
(46.3)
129
(2.2)
6,002
(100)
Note:  Total population is 22,772 (F=26.4%) & 16.770 (M=73.6%). Lightly shaded numbers and percentages 
are the marriageable groups.
Source: Adapted from data provided by the UNHCR office in Kuala Lumpur.
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(13–59 years) i.e. a male/female ratio of 4: 1. The table also reveals that while 
there are 7,163 married men, there are only 2,235 married women. This indi-
cates that a large number of the married men (4,928) do not have their wives 
with them in Malaysia. The wives are back home in Myanmar or somewhere else, 
such as in Thailand where many of the Rohingya men live for some time before 
making their way into Malaysia. Hence there is a high demand for women from 
unmarried males as well as from married men unaccompanied by their respec-
tive wives. It is common practice for members of the latter group to take another 
wife in Malaysia before they send for their first wife. As mentioned earlier, many 
men migrate without their wives and children and send for them later, when 
they have enough money to pay for their passage. This may take years. One male 
respondent in our study left when his baby girl was born and it took him 15 years 
before he could bring his wife and daughter to Malaysia. In the meantime he 
took another wife in Malaysia and had four children with her. Another respon-
dent is not so lucky; he was not able to save enough money to send for his wife 
and two children whom he has not seen for the last twenty years. Mindful of the 
expected long separation from their wives and family members, many Rohingya 
men take another wife in Malaysia, ending up with the dual responsibility of hav-
ing to support both wives and families.
This population imbalance between the number of marriageable men and 
women has led to a high demand for prospective brides. The result is a decline 
in the age of marriage for girls. Many Rohingya girls are married off by their par-
ents at the age of twelve and thirteen years old, a much lower age compared to 
that of girls in their native state of Rakhine, Myanmar, who are generally married 
off at fifteen and sixteen years of age. The marriage of young girls contravenes 
Malaysian Islamic Family law that specifies the minimum age of marriage for 
women as sixteen. This, according to many parents, is to safeguard the girls’ rep-
utation. Few girls go to school and have little to do at home. With so much free 
time and many single men around, parents are afraid their young daughters may 
get involved in extra-marital relationships that will tarnish the girls’ reputation 
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and that of their family.
The gender imbalance has also led to an escalation in bride wealth (mahr) 
and marriage gifts which are now beyond the reach of many Rohingya men. A 
forty year old man in Trengganu whose wife left him and his four young children 
for another man had to pay the mahr (obligatory marriage payment among Mus-
lims) and a gift totalling around RM12,000 to a female relative - the mother of a 
twelve year old girl - before she consented to his marrying her young daughter. 
A young man in Kulai, Johor reportedly had to offer RM20,000 to the parent of 
a girl found for him by his parents before they agreed to accept him as their son-
in-law. He had to save every cent of his meagre wages as a restaurant cook for 
three years to come up with the amount. These are extreme cases. On average, a 
marriage can cost a man up to about RM5,000 for the mahr gift in addition to the 
cost of the wedding reception, which is still high considering their typically low 
and irregular incomes. To overcome the shortage of marriageable girls, many 
families resort to “importing” brides from among relatives back home. This is 
also a costly exercise as the cost of “smuggling” in a bride is about RM8,000 if she 
is to come “legally” on fake passports via Bangladesh, though much less if she 
is to be smuggled in through Thailand. For those who cannot afford to import 
a Rohingya bride from Rakhine, the only option is to marry out of their ethnic 
group.
With regards to choosing a bride from outside their ethnic group, many 
Rohingya male interviewees expressed keenness to marry Malay women. Howev-
er, this would also be a costly exercise due to the high cost of marriage gifts - in 
monetary form and in kind (hantaran) – that many Malay families expect from 
prospective grooms. Among many Malay communities, the higher a girl’s social 
status, the greater the hantaran. The lowest monetary gift for a prospective Ma-
lay bride from a working class family in the Kelang Valley is RM2,000 – 3,000. 
Additional gifts in kind may be of equal cost. A few Rohingya men are willing to 
pay for such a marriage as it has many advantages, which will be explained later. 
Unfortunately, many Malay women are not keen on Rohingya men because of 
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their uncertain legal status and low socio-economic standing. Moreover, there is 
also the widely circulated negative stereotype that Rohingya refugees are prone 
to crime. The few Rohingya men who have married Malay women tend to be 
well-educated - graduates of college or university in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Paki-
stan, or Malaysia - who are already economically stable or have potential to move 
up the socio-economic ladder. Such marriages are seen by many Rohingya men 
as avenues for socio-economic improvement.
For many Rohingya men who cannot afford to marry their own kind or 
Malay women, the other option is to marry other available women in Malaysia, 
especially Muslims. There is presently a large reservoir of marriageable women 
among foreign workers in Malaysia. At any one time, about half of the millions 
of legally recruited foreign workers in the country are women. In addition, 
there are also a high number of female irregular migrants; official estimates are 
between 1.5 to 3 million in 2011. The majority are Indonesians – mostly Mus-
lim - engaged mainly as domestic workers, production operators in the manu-
facturing sector, and service sector workers such as cleaners, cooks, or general 
restaurant workers. Many Rohingya men are engaged in somewhat similar low-
skilled jobs, which gives them the opportunity to mix with and become close to 
these women. Many ended up marrying Indonesian women as their first, second, 
or third wives. Our earlier study on 666 married Rohingya men in 2009 reveals 
that about 22.7 % of them married out (1.5% married Malay women, 20.4% In-
donesians, and 0.8% Thai women). Our present study shows that these statistics 
were conservative. There are also marriages between Rohingya men and other 
non-Myanmar ethnic groups such as Muslim Burman and Malaysian Indian Mus-
lims which were not captured in our earlier fieldwork. Based on the new findings 
we estimate that around 25% of married Rohingya men in Malaysia have spouses 
from outside their ethnic group.
Why are Rohingya men prone to marry Indonesian women? These women, 
who are usually low-skilled workers, are easily accessible to Rohingya men as they 
are often employed in the same sectors. Marriage with them costs much less. 
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In some cases it only involves payment of the obligatory mahr, which is a small 
token sum (sometimes less than RM100) agreed between the prospective bride 
and groom. The bride-to-be has no relatives to decide on the amount of mahr or 
hantaran to be given and how and when the marriage is to be conducted. Hence 
the marriage can be performed swiftly. Another advantage is the absence of the 
wife’s close relatives in Malaysia that can interfere with the marriage.
Many reasons induce Indonesian women to marry Rohingya men. A few 
have problems with their employers and need to escape. Others have problems 
with their families back home, such as existing husbands taking another wife and 
abusing the money they remit. A few are desperately lonely and feel unsafe as 
they have never been away from their family before. They need a shoulder to cry 
on, moral support, and protection, which the Rohingya men can give. The case 
below illustrates circumstances that led to a Rohingya-Indonesian marriage.
Case 1. Tina, an Indonesian woman from Java, Indonesia, was seven-
teen when she arrived in Malaysia to work in a restaurant owned by a 
Malay family twelve years ago. She was happy with her job as the family 
who hired her treated her well, like “a daughter”. She lived with the 
family, helping with the housework in addition to her duties at a restau-
rant. Her good looks put her in harm’s way. Her elderly male boss fell 
desperately in love with her and would make passes at her when his wife 
was away. He also asked her to be his second wife. Afraid that she may 
be raped one day as they stayed in the same house, she confided her 
problems to a Rohingya man who worked at another restaurant in the 
vicinity. The man helped her to run away and found a safe place for her 
to stay with a family. By leaving her employer, Tina became an illegal 
immigrant. This put her in a difficult position as she could be arrest-
ed if she went out to work. She eventually became dependent on the 
Rohingya man who helped her, and finally married him. The husband 
registered her with the UNHCR, who gave her a letter acknowledging 
her as the wife of a refugee. With this letter she is quite free to move 
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about, for as a refugee’s wife she is less likely to be arrested by enforce-
ment officers. Even if she was arrested, intervention by the UNHCR 
may lead to her release.
Unlike Tina, many Indonesian women marry Rohingya men as their second or 
third wife, as their first and/or second wives are still in Myanmar or elsewhere. 
As shown earlier, thousands of Rohingya men live alone, away from their wives 
who they hope to bring over some day. In the meantime, they need female living 
companions, and Indonesian women suit this purpose. The women too, quite 
often do not contemplate a long-lasting marriage; only for the period while they 
are working in Malaysia. Many want to return home when their work contract is 
over. Some view the marriage as akin to a Mutaah marriage8, allowable in some 
Islamic sects, but not in Malaysia.
Most of the Indonesian women who have married Rohingya men are Mus-
lims. We found only two cases of non-Muslim women in such marriages. Both 
were in Penang. One was a Christian Batak from Sumatra and the other a Hindu 
from Bali. Both converted to Islam prior to their marriage.
7. Solemnization of Marriage
Malaysia has two sets of family laws, one for non-Muslims and the other for 
Muslims. Muslims are subject to Syariah law and state administrative procedure 
requires them to register their marriage at the nearest Syariah court in the 
district where they marry (see among others, Ahmad Ibrahim 1999 & Mimi Ka-
mariah 1999). However, in light of their status as refugees, the Rohingyas are 
not covered by Malaysian Muslim family law. Among the Rohingyas, marriage is 
conducted according to the basic requirements of Islam which require only the 
groom, bride to be, and her wali (guardian) - generally her father or his rep-
resentative - to give her away in the presence of two sane, adult, credible male 
witnesses. The marriage is not registered and as such not documented. The lack 
of documentation means there is no marriage certificate. This will give rise to a 
number of problems with regards to the rights of wife and husband should the 
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couple get divorced, and to the status of the children born into the marriage.
Many problems have arisen as a result of the lack of marriage certificates. 
The most common now is enticement of another man’s wife. There are cases of 
women running away from their husband and marrying another man while the 
earlier marriage is still valid. To curb such incidences from escalating, there have 
been attempts by some Rohingya associations such as CRIPDO (Community Ro-
hingya Pro-Democracy Organisation) - a Johor based community organisation 
- in 2003 to document Rohingya marriages and issue married couples with mar-
riage certificates9. In Selangor, similar initiatives were carried out by the Rohing-
ya Islamic organization Majlis Ulama Rohingya (MUR, or Council of Rohingya 
Ulama), which caters for all Rohingya communities in the Peninsula10. Subse-
quently, other Rohingya associations have begun issuing their own marriage cer-
tificates. However, not many Rohingyas bother to register their marriage. Some 
do not realise the relevance of marriage registration and the need for marriage 
certificates. Many of those who do have complained of the high cost of registra-
tion and issuance of certificates, which is between RM50 and RM200 depending 
on the distance of the place of marriage from the location of the issuing office. 
Others accuse the certificate issuing agency of not investigating the status of 
the prospective married couples before issuing a certificate, which defeats the 
purpose of certification, and enables married men and women to contract other 
marriages, resulting in men and women committing polygamy, which is permit-
ted in Islam for men, but not for women. In addition, the marriage certificates 
issued are not always recognized by Malaysian state agencies. For example, to 
register a newly born baby at the National Registration Department, department 
staffs insist on seeing, among other documents, the parents’ identity cards and 
their marriage certificate. Responses to these certificates from state officials vary 
between districts within a state, between states, as well as between Federal and 
state authorities. In Kelantan, such certificates are recognised, while in Selangor 
and Kedah, they are not always so. The police may recognise these certificates, 
but the Department of Immigration or members of paramilitary units such as 
196
Azizah Kassim
the Angkatan Relawan Malaysia (RELA) may not.
Many Rohingya living close to the Thai border, particularly in the states 
of Kelantan, Kedah, and Perlis, overcome difficulties in getting a marriage cer-
tificate by solemnising their marriage in Thailand. Islamic religious leaders in 
southern Thailand are ever willing to conduct marriages for Muslims of any or-
igin for a fee much lower than that charged by religious functionaries in Malay-
sia. The Thai southern states of Narathiwat and Patani are two popular places for 
Muslims - especially from Malaysia - who want to get married swiftly and cheaply.
8. Impact of Exogamic Marriage on the Rohingya Community
Marrying out to a Malaysian woman is considered to be a wise move for Rohing-
yas as it removes many of the limitations they face in their daily lives. The refu-
gee husband can apply for a spousal visa to stay in Malaysia. The wife’s name or 
that of her relatives can be used to get trading / business licenses, the couple 
can open a bank account in the wife’s name, buy properties, etc. Their children 
will automatically be conferred Malaysian citizenship, and enjoy all the benefits 
and privileges that Malaysian citizenship can offer. Incidents of Rohingya men 
marrying Malay women are more common in the east coast states of Kelantan 
and Terengganu where the Rohingya population is relatively small, and they live 
among Malays. Such marriages have led to the assimilation of some Rohingyas 
into Malay society.
It is when Rohingya men marry foreign women in Malaysia that serious 
problems can occur. Should they have children, they may not be able to register 
their children’s birth and procure birth certificates for them because they do 
not have marriage certificates, or because their marriage certificates issued by a 
community based organisation are not recognized by officials at the Malaysian 
National Registration Department. In cases where birth certificates are issued to 
the offspring of Rohingya men married to Indonesian women, only the mother’s 
name and particulars are included and not the father’s, giving the impression 
that the baby is illegitimate. The baby is accorded the nationality of the mother, 
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i.e. Indonesian. When this happens, the child technically ceases to be a Rohingya 
and a refugee, and is ineligible for the assistance and protection of the UNHCR.
Their problems become more acute when the Malaysian government 
launches operations against illegal/ irregular migrants from time to time. Pres-
ently, the government is carrying out operations to round up illegal immigrants 
under the 6P Program11. We received reports of many Indonesian women mar-
ried to Rohingyas being arrested along with their children while their spouses 
were at work. They are removed from their homes and brought to immigrant 
holding centres (referred to locally as KDN Depots) because they are viewed as 
undocumented Indonesian citizens; or as over-stayers if they arrived in Malaysia 
through authorised ports of entry. Both mother and children are deported to In-
donesia and there is little the UNHCR office can do to get them released. After 
deportation, if they can afford to do so, they return to Malaysia legally or other-
wise for a family reunion. If not, the family members remain separated.
A few Indonesian women in such mixed marriages stay with their Rohingya 
husband only until their children are of school going age. They then take the 
children to Indonesia, leaving their Rohingya husband in Malaysia to continue 
with his work so that he can send money regularly for the upkeep of his family 
in Indonesia. By doing so, they are able to afford their children a state education 
in Indonesia, as refugee children cannot attend state schools in Malaysia. But 
such an arrangement breaks families apart. A Rohingya man in Sungai Petani, 
Kedah who found himself in this predicament had not seen his wife and three 
children for five years. As a refugee, he cannot get a passport to visit them. After 
living alone and having to work hard daily to send money monthly to a wife and 
children he has not seen for so long, the husband now feels his wife is stringing 
him along. This marriage is already on the rocks, as are many others in similar 
arrangements.
Another negative consequence of such marriages relates to the right of 
resettlement to a third country. If a Rohingya man who marries an Indonesian 
woman has no marriage certificate as proof of their marriage, the non-Rohingya 
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wife will not be eligible to join him for resettlement. In addition, all receiving 
countries recognise only monogamous marriage and consequently, second or 
third wives of a Rohingya man will not be allowed to accompany him in resettle-
ment.
9. Concluding Remarks
The refugees encounter many problems in their daily lives and this chapter 
highlights only one of them. The root of their plight is the lack of legal admin-
istrative procedures to deal with refugees in Malaysia. Presently, three solutions 
to refugee problems are practised by the UNHCR. Firstly, sending them to third 
countries; secondly, voluntary repatriation, and thirdly, local integration. For 
the Rohingya, repatriation is not possible as they are stateless, and resettlement 
seems very slow where they are concerned. By 2010 only 620 Rohingyas had 
been sent for resettlement (The Equal Rights Trust 2010: 10) compared to thou-
sands of Christian Chins, also from Myanmar. There are allegations that many 
receiving countries are reluctant to admit Muslim refugees such as the Rohingya 
due to widespread misconceptions that Muslims are prone to violence, a stereo-
type made popular by former U.S. President Bush. Given such circumstances the 
Rohingyas will remain in Malaysia for a long time and it is in the best interests of 
Malaysia to examine closely the plight of the Rohingya to formulate a compre-
hensive plan to overcome their problems.
Unless the various problems facing refugees are addressed, Malaysia may be 
inundated with an uneducated, unskilled refugee population who will be easily 
led into anti-social and criminal activities that challenge internal security. It is 
in the country’s interests to develop a comprehensive plan to accommodate the 
Rohingyas, and accord them their fundamental human rights consistent with the 
UDHR, Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Convention on Equality 
and Discriminations Against Women (CEDAW), and other international proto-
cols or conventions.
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Notes
 1 Guest Scholar, Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS), Univer-
siti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia. azizahbtekassim@
gmail.com
 2 Others include about 80,000 Filipino refugees in Sabah and approximately 40,000 
“persons under UNHCR stateless mandate”.
 3 Based on statistics from the Immigration Department, in 2011 there were over 1.8 
million legal foreign workers and around 1.3 million irregular workers registered 
with the department.
 4 Failure to renew the IMM13 pass changes the status of the refugee to “illegal im-
migrants”.
 5 As constituent states in Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak has jurisdiction over matters 
relating to immigration.
 6 There are 24 such learning centers run by UNHCR in collaboration with non-gov-
ernment organizations or, in the case of Islamic religious centers, the madrasah, by 
their local community leaders.
 7 In many urban areas, there is an oversupply of shop houses which remain vacant 
for years. To avoid losses many owners let their shops to be used as a “hostel” for 
foreign workers engaged in the service, manufacturing, and construction sectors.
 8 A Mutaah marriage is a marital contract entered by two consenting parties who 
agree to be husband and wife for a stipulated, short period of time. This is to en-
sure that male-female relationships takes place within the institution of marriage, 
where the rights and obligations of both husband and wife and offspring (should 
there be any) will be upheld under Islamic law. Such a union is presently prohibit-
ed in many Muslim communities.
 9 Interview with the founder of CRIPDO at his home in Batu Arang Selangor in July 
2012.
 10 MUR claims they have received the endorsement of Selangor’s religious depart-
ment. The writer is unable to verify this claim.
 11 The 6P program was formulated and implemented in 2011 to reduce the number 
of irregular migrants in the country. The name refers to Pendaftaran (registration), 
Pemutihan (legalization), Pengampunan (amnesty), Pemantauan, (monitoring), Pen-
guatkuasaan (enforcement), and Pengusiran (deportation), which was carried out 
consecutively in stages during the program’s implementation.
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